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Abstract: This paper presents a goal based methodology for HAZOP studies in which a functional model of the 
plant is used to assist in a functional decomposition of the plant starting from the purpose of the plant and 
continuing down to the function of a single node, e.g. a pipe section. This approach leads to nodes with simple 
functions such as liquid transport, gas transport, liquid storage, gas-liquid contacting etc. From the functions of 
the nodes the selection of relevant process variables and deviation variables follows directly. The knowledge 
required to perform the pre-meeting HAZOP task of dividing the plant along functional lines is that of chemical 
unit operations and transport processes plus a some familiarity with the plant a hand. Thus the preparatory work 
may be performed by a chemical engineer with just an introductory course in risk assessment. The goal based 
methodology lends itself directly for implementation into a computer aided reasoning tool for HAZOP studies 
to perform root cause and consequence analysis.  Such a tool will facilitate finding causes far away from the 
site of the deviation. A Functional HAZOP Assistant is proposed and investigated in a HAZOP study of an 
industrial scale Indirect Vapour Recompression Distillation pilot Plant (IVaRDiP) at the DTU-Dept. of 
Chemical and Biochemical Engineering. The study shows that the goal based methodology using a functional 
approach provides a very efficient paradigm for facilitating HAZOP studies and for enabling reasoning to 
reveal potential hazards in safety critical operations. 
Keyword: risk Assessment, HAZOP, multilevel flow modelling 
 
1 Introduction1
Hazard analysis provides a systematic methodology for 
identification, evaluation and mitigation of potential 
process hazards which can cause serious human, 
environmental and economic losses. Different methods 
are practiced at various stages during the plant life 
cycle. Most methods require considerable time and 
resources. Consequentially research has been 
stimulated to develop computer aided tools to assist in 
or even aiming at automating hazard analysis. 
 
Venkatasubramanian et.al[1] reviewed development of 
knowledge based systems for automating HAZard and 
OPerability (HAZOP) analysis. Venkatasubramanian 
and Vaidhyanathan[2]  describe a knowledge based 
framework, which addresses the representation of 
process specific and generic knowledge in the 
automation of HAZOP studies. The generic HAZOP 
knowledge, which is applicable to a wide variety of 
flow sheets, is called process general knowledge, while 
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the remaining HAZOP knowledge is considered 
specific to a particular process, and is called process 
specific knowledge. Bragatto et.al[3] build upon the 
notions introduced above and exploits process 
knowledge with the aim to develop tools for the experts 
to reveal potential hazards, rooted in a function based 
taxonomy for equipment and instrumentation. Thus 
their system includes a dictionary, a plant information 
database, a reasoning and analysis engine and a 
knowledge repository. The dictionary permits linking 
between the terminology used in hazard analysis and a 
particular application area. In their system objects are 
categorized according to a hierarchically organised 
functionality based taxonomy, which can be mapped to 
the corresponding STEP data definition[4].  Thus each 
item is classified in terms of super-function, function 
type and with an associated set of functional 
parameters. However the above methods relate the 
concept of function directly to a physical 
implementation and therefore they limit the possibility 
to abstract from one layer in a goal hierarchy to another. 
Consequently it is desirable to develop a HAZOP 
analysis methodology based upon a model 
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representation which can encompass the operational 
goal hierarchy for the plant. Such a functional model 
should represent the system using the means-end 
concepts, where a system is described using goals and 
purposes in one dimension, and whole-part concepts in 
another dimension. Such a functional modeling 
approach lends itself directly for implementation into a 
computer aided reasoning tool for HAZOP studies to 
perform cause and consequence analysis. Thereby 
functional modelling can provide a systematic 
methodology for computer assisted HAZOP studies, 
thus potentially relieving the engineers from a major 
part of a rather cumbersome task and instead permitting 
them to focus attention where significant problems 
may be uncovered. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present the background 
for development of a functional model based reasoning 
system for assisting in a goal based methodology for  
HAZOP analysis. The resulting tool is called a 
Functional HAZOP Assistant. This tool will be 
illustrated on an Indirect Vapour Recompression 
Distillation Pilot Plant (IVaRDiP) located at the 
Department of Chemical Engineering, at the Technical 
University of Denmark. The following section briefly 
introduces a traditional HAZOP, then the functional 
modeling methodology and the associated reasoning 
engine are described. The goal based HAZOP analysis 
methodology using a functional model leads to the 
Functional HAZOP Assistant, which is presented next. 
The Functional HAZOP Assistant is demonstrated on 
the case study. Finally the presented methodology is 
discussed and the conclusions are drawn. 
 
2 Methods 
The proposed methodology is based upon experiences 
from traditional HAZOP studies. The procedure for 
such studies is described before introducing a 
functional modeling paradigm and a workbench for 
model building and a reasoning engine.  
 
2.1 Traditional HAZOP procedure 
Since the development of hazard and operability 
(HAZOP) studies by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) 
Ltd. in the mid 1960's these have been a cornerstone in 
risk assessment of process plants[5-7]. The purpose of 
the HAZOP study is to investigate how a facility 
responds to deviations from design intent or from 
normal operation, i.e. to reveal if the plant has 
sufficient control and safety features to ensure, that it 
can cope with expected deviations normally 
encountered during operation. The HAZOP study is 
traditionally performed as a structured brainstorming 
exercise facilitated by a HAZOP study leader and 
exploiting experience of the participants. A traditional 
HAZOP study has the following phases[8]: 
• Pre-meeting phase: The purpose and objective of 
the study is defined. The leader of the HAZOP 
study gathers information about the facility, such as 
process flow diagrams (PFD), piping & 
instrumentation diagrams (P&ID), a plant layout, 
chemical hazard data etc., and proposes a division 
of the plant into sections and nodes. For each node - 
or for the plant as a whole - the leader identifies 
relevant process variables and deviations from 
design intent or normal operation based on either 
past experience or company guidelines. The leader 
also identifies the participants, who will participate 
in the review of the different sections of the plant, 
and ensures their availability. Typically this group 
includes the process design engineer, the control 
engineer, the project engineer and an operator 
besides the experienced team leader. All these 
people have large demands on their time during a 
project. The team leader schedules a sufficient 
number of half day HAZOP meetings. 
• Meeting phase: At the start of the HAZOP meeting 
the technique is briefly reviewed, and the specific 
scope of the present study is stated. The overall 
facilities are described e.g. using a 3D computer 
model. Then the team considers each P&ID or PFD 
in turn. The team leader ensures that process 
variables and deviations are considered in a 
rigorous and structured manner, that results are 
recorded, and that all areas meriting further 
consideration are identified by action items. 
• Post-meeting phase: After the HAZOP meeting all 
actions items are followed up by the persons 
assigned to them during the meeting and the results 
of the follow-up is reported to the team leader. The 
team might call a review meeting to determine the 
status of all actions items, and decide if additional 
efforts are needed. 
 
Thus a HAZOP study requires considerable time and 
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resources whenever it is carried out during the plant life 
cycle. Consequentially research has been stimulated to 
develop computer aided tools to assist in or even 
aiming at automating hazard analysis and especially 
HAZOP studies.  
 
Although HAZOP analysis is a well accepted tool for 
risk assessment in many industries very little has been 
published on a theoretical basis for HAZOP studies. 
HAZOP studies are used to investigate deviations from 
a norm: the normal operating conditions or the design 
intent, i.e. the goal of the system. This is traditionally 
done by asking questions such as what deviations can 
occur? Why do they occur? (causes), How are they 
revealed? (consequences). These questions are asked 
after first dividing the whole system into its constituent 
parts. The questions stated relate to the goal of the 
system while the process represents the means for 
achieving these goals. Therefore it seems highly 
relevant to develop a HAZOP assistant based upon 
means-ends modelling combined with whole-parts 
concepts to grasp the different levels of abstraction 
when needed. Thus models based on these concepts, 
such as functional models will form a convenient basis 
for an HAZOP assistant. The HAZOP assistant 
developed in this work uses a functional model to 
combine the system goal structure with the means to 
achieve these goals. 
 
In the following section a HAZOP assistent using a 
functional model builder to build a MFM model of the 
system and a reasoning engine are presented before the 
goal based  methodology for  HAZOP analysis using 
a functional approach is proposed. 
 
2.2 Functional modelling methodology 
Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) is used here to 
combine the means-end dimension with the whole part 
dimension, to describe the functions of the process 
under study and to enable modelling at different 
abstraction levels. MFM is a modeling methodology 
which has been developed to support functional 
modeling of process plants involving interactions 
between material, energy and information 
flows[9],[10]. Functions are here represented by 
elementary flow functions interconnected to form flow 
structures representing a particular goal oriented view 
of the system. MFM is founded on fundamental 
concepts of action developed by VonWright[11]. Each of 
the elementary flow functions can thus be seen as 
instances of more generic action types. The views 
represented by the flow structures are related by 
means-end relations and comprise together a 
comprehensive model of the functional organization of 
the system. The basic modeling concepts of MFM 
comprises objectives, flow structures, a set of 
functional primitives (the flow functions) and a set of 
means-end relations and causal roles representing 
purpose related dependencies between functions. The 
functions, the flow structures and the relations are 
interconnected to form a hypergraph like structure. 
 
2.3 Functional model builder and reasoning system 
A MFM model builder has been developed in MSVisio. 
Stencils implementing icons for the MFM concepts are 
used to build a model graphically, see Fig 1. The model 
builder is interfaced with a reasoning system which can 
generate root causes and causal paths for a given fault 
scenario i.e. a top event (failed MFM function) and 
status information for selected flow functions. The 
reasoning system is implemented using the Java based 
expert system shell Jess[12]. Rules for reasoning about 
function states in MFM models are implemented as a 
Jess rule base. 
 
The MFM-models consist of flow function blocks, 
causal roles and flow structures, as shown in Fig 2. The 
current set of function blocks are source, transport, 
balance and sink. Definition of the causal roles is 
essential as they enable implementation of a reasoning 
system. Work is presently on going to extend the set of 
functions to easier handle chemical reactions and 
multicomponent systems.  
 
3 Results 
The functional modeling approach described above 
forms the basis for a developing a functional HAZOP 
assistant for a goal based methodology for HAZOP 
analysis. 
 
3.1 A Functional HAZOP assistant 
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Traditionally the division of the plant into sections may 
be done by defining each major process component as a 
section. A section could also be a line between each 
major component with additional sections for each 
branch of the main process flow direction. Usually the 
function of a section or of a node is not directly 
specified; many HAZOP formats only identify the part 
of the process considered by project number, P&ID 
number and line number. The design intent of the node 
may go unrecorded, even though the purpose of the 
HAZOP study is to consider deviations from design 
intent. 
 
The goal based methodology for HAZOP analysis 
provides a structured approach where the study is 
divided into three phases, corresponding to the 
traditional approach described above. The first phase 
corresponds to the premeeeting phase, the second 
phase to the meeting phase and the third phase to the 
post meeting phase. Thus the Functional HAZOP 
assistant involves the following steps[13]: 
 
Phase 1: 
1. State the purpose of the plant. 
2. Divide the plant into sections each of which has a 
clear sub-purpose or -aim in contributing to the 
overall purpose of the plant. 
3. Divide each section into nodes, the function of 
which can be directly described by physical or 
chemical phenomena. Examples of such 
phenomena are: gas transport, liquid transport, 
liquid storage and gas-liquid contact. 
4. At this point an MFM model may be directly 
developed using the model builder as described 
above (in case a model is not already available) 
provided that the physical and chemical phenomena 
are included in the existing model set. 
5. For each type of node, i.e. each physical or 
chemical phenomenon, describe the process 
variable(-s), which identifies design intent or 
normal operation. For  a node with the function 
'gas transport' normal operation could be described 
by flow rate, temperature, pressure and number of 
phases.  
6. For each process variable specify the relevant 
deviations. For flows relevant deviations could be 
more, less and reverse. In this work the deviation 
'no flow' is considered a limiting situation of 'less 
flow', and hence is not considered separately.  
 
Phase 2:  
1. Perform the diagnosis on the MFM workbench by 
working through the plant sections and nodes in 
sequence and analysing the deviations one by one.  
2. Analyse the identified causes of hazardous 
conditions perhaps by refining the analysis through 
a more detailed study in case of a serious hazard or 
cause. 
Fig 1. MFM model builder and reasoning system. 
 
Fig 2. Elements af MFM models consist of flow functions 
(row one and two) and causal roles (row three).functions (row 
one and two) and causal roles (row three). 
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3. Record the identified causes and the underlying 
reasoning for later reference. 
 
The application of the Functional HAZOP assistant is 
illustrated in the following through performing a 
HAZOP study on an industrial scale pilot plant at the 
Technical University of Denmark, see process 
diagrams in Figs 3 and 4. 
Phase 3:  
1.   For identified hazards then investigate and decide 
how to manage these,  through a) definition of an 
alarm with a consequential response potential for 
the operator, b) Implementation of modified on line 
control of the plant, c) redesign of a part of the plant, 
or d) another action. 
2.  Record the final decision and the underlying 
reasoning for later reference. 
 
Phase 1 may be carried out in a straightforward manner 
by using the functional approach. For example the aim 
of the plant could be to produce 50 tons of PE per hour. 
In order to achieve this we need sections which: feed 
reactants to the reactor, feed catalyst to the reactor, 
reaction, remove excess heat from the reactor, remove 
product from the reactor, remove of unreacted 
hydrocarbons from product, add additives to virgin PE 
etc. The reaction section could be considered as a 
single node with the purpose of providing suitable 
conditions, such that raw materials react to form 
products. For a Unipol PE reactor this would require 
maintaining fluidization of the PE particles to facilitate 
their growth as well as the transport of heat of reaction 
away from the PE particles to ensure they do not melt 
or fuse together. 
Fig 3. Process diagram of indirect vapour recompression 
distillation pilot plant – column. 
 
 Fig 4. Process diagram of indirect vapour recompression 
distillation pilot plant – heat pump. Using this approach to dividing the plant all that is 
needed is a basic understanding of chemical unit 
operations, their purposes and the fundamentals on 
which these purposes are built, i.e. transport 
phenomena. This means that phase 1 of a HAZOP 
study may be efficiently performed by less experienced 
personnel. Phase 2 requires more experience. 
 
 
3.2 Functional HAZOP of distillation pilot plant The above proposed three step procedure clearly 
becomes a significant task even though the HAZOP 
assistant will enable consistent reasoning not only 
within the single nodes but also between nodes and 
sections and thereby facilitate revealing more complex 
causes of deviations than possible using the traditional 
approach. The workflow during phase 2 would indeed 
be expected to be significantly facilitated though the 
HAZOP assistant. During phase three the functional 
modelling may actually also be utilized. However, this 
has not been studied in the present work. 
The indirect vapour recompression distillation pilot 
plant (IVaRDiP) at the Department of Chemical and 
Biochemical Engineering consists of a distillation 
column which is integrated with a heat pump. Process 
schematics of the column and the heat pump are shown 
in Figs 3 and 4. 
 
The purpose of the column is to separate a feed stream 
into two pure product streams while minimising energy 
used. To accomplish this the following subsystems are 
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Node 4defined: 
• Column section. Purpose: Gas-liquid contact to 
facilitate separation. 
• Re-flux section.  Purpose: Provide a liquid 
stream to the column and remove excess liquid as 
top product. 
• Feed section. Purpose: Provide a feed stream as 
close as possible to the conditions on the feed 
plate. 
• Re-boiler section. Purpose: Provide a gas stream 
to the column and remove excess liquid as 
bottoms product. 
• Low pressure heat pump section. Purpose: 
Transport energy from re-flux section to 
compressors. 
• High pressure heat pump section, including 
compressors. Purpose: Increase the heat pump 
fluid energy content by compression and transport 
heatpump fluid from compressors to re-boiler. 
• Excess heat removal section. Purpose: Transport 
of excess energy from the heat pump to the 
environment. 
• Tank Park. Purpose: Provide storage for raw 
material and products. 
 
3.3 Building an MFM model 
The IVaRDiP is divided into 8 sections in step 2 of the 
functional HAZOP approach. Then each section is 
further divided into nodes according to their function. 
For example the re-flux section, see Fig 3, which 
consists of the piping from the top of the column 
through the condenser and accumulator (DEC) back to 
the column as well as the piping from the accumulator 
to the top product storage tank, is divided into the 
following nodes during step 3: 
• Node 1. Function: Gas transport. Piping from the 
column to the condenser (HECOND) including 
the emergency shutdown valve (V3) and other 
instrumentation. 
• Node 2. Function: Liquid transport. Condenser 
and piping from condenser to accumulator 
including a pump (PC) and other instrumentation. 
• Node 3. Function: Liquid storage. Accumulator 
(DEC) and associated instrumentation. 
• . Function: Liquid transport. Piping from 
accumulator to top product storage including the 
product pump (PT) and product cooler (HETW) 
with the associated instrumentation. 
Node 5• . Function: Liquid transport. Piping from 
the accumulator to the column, where re-flux 
enters, including the re-flux pump (PR) and 
associated instrumentation. 
 
Upon this subdivision of the section it is directly 
possible to construct the MFM using the MFM 
workbench described above.  The MFM-model of the 
reflux section is shown in Fig 5 using the symbols 
shown in Fig 2. The model begins with the source of 
gas from the column, which is represented by the 
source function so1.55. The source function is 
connected to a transport function tr1.43, which 
represents the transport of gas from the column to the 
condensor, HECOND – see Fig 3. The condenser is 
represented by the storage function st1.4. Following 
the condenser the liquid moves to the reflux drum 
(DEC in Fig 3),  and this transport, which in the 
physical plant is performed by pump PC (see Fig 3) is 
represented by the flow function tr1.44, while the 
reflux drum is represented by the storage function st1.5. 
From the reflux drum the liquid can move either back 
to the column as reflux or to the top product tank as 
product. 
 
The path from the reflux drum to the product tank is 
modelled by 4 flow functions: the transport function 
tr1.49, which represents the top product pump, the 
storage function st1.6, which represents the top product 
cooler HETW (see Fig 3), the transport function tr1.50, 
which represents a control valve, and the sink function 
si1.1, which represents the top product storage tank. 
 
The path from the reflux drum and back to the colum as 
reflux is modelled by 6 flow functions: the transport 
function tr1.51, which represents a binary valve, the 
balance function bal1.21, which represents a  section 
of pipe, the transport function tr1.52, which represents 
the reflux pump PR (see Fig  3), the balance function 
bal1.22, which represents another section of pipe, the 
transport function tr1.53, which represents another 
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valve, and finally the sink si1.55, which represents the 
column. Note this model could be simplified, e.g. by 
combining the transport function tr1.51, the balance 
function bal1.21 and the transport function tr1.52 into a 
single transport function. Likewise additional detail 
could be added to parts of the model as needed given 
the pupose of the MFM modelling. Rossing[13] expands 
on the model of reflux section, and derives a model of 
the complete IvaRDiP pilot plant, as shown in Fig 7. 
 
The other sections of the distillation pilot plant are 
similarly divided into nodes, i.e. each node relates to a 
function described by physical or chemical phenomena. 
In this way a total of 20 nodes are defined. However, 
several nodes have the same function, as can already be 
seen from the above sub-division of the re-flux section. 
In fact 7 of the 20 nodes have the function 'liquid 
transport'. Having developed the MFM model for the 
different nodes these are directly concatenated to form 
the MFM model for the plant. In defining the function 
of the node the variables necessary to describe design 
intent follows directly. E.g. the process variables and 
deviations relevant for the function 'liquid transport' 
will be: 
• Flow: more, less, reverse, as well as. 
• Temperature: lower, higher. 
and similarly for the function 'gas transport' 
• Flow: more, less, reverse, as well as. 
• Temperature: lower, higher. 
• Pressure: lower, higher 
 
Having completed phase 1 it is now possible to enter 
phase 2, where the reasoning engine is used to perform 
the actual HAZOP study in step 7. During this step the 
HAZOP Assistant can be extremely helpful in 
providing the reasoning necessary to identify potential 
hazards. Initially it is recommended to perform the 
exhaustive evaluation for each variable in each node. 
Later as experience is accumulated it may be possible 
to facilitate also this step further. Below two analyses 
carried out on the IVaRDiP will be described briefly.  
 
As an example of the application of the reasoning 
engine the causal tree for the deviation: low volume in 
storage function st1.5 is shown in Fig 6. The reasoning 
engine finds, that low volume in the storage function 
can be caused by low flow towards the storage or high 
flow from the storage. Rossing[13] presents more 
extended reasoning results for different MFM models. 
Fig 5. MFM-model of the reflux section of IVaRDiP. 
 
Fig 6. Causal tree of the event low volume in storage 
function st1.5 obtained by using the reasoning engine on the 
MFM-model of the reflux section shown in Fig 5. 
3.3 Traditional versus functional HAZOP 
The result of a traditional HAZOP of the re-flux section 
of the distillation pilot plant is compared to the results 
of the Functional HAZOP Assistant. The results 
demonstrate that while the traditional approach 
provides 14 records in the HAZOP, then the Functional 
HAZOP Assistant only provides 8 records with the 
same information content. Hence the Functional 
HAZOP Assistant requires half the effort in evaluating 
the causes of deviations, i.e. the number of lines in the 
HAZOP report. Clearly the time required to perform 
the HAZOP will be significant shorter for the HAZOP 
Assistant, when a MFM model is available, than for a 
traditional HAZOP.  
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In addition the availability of a scientifically based 
systematic approach to performing the HAZOP 
provides an interesting potential for the HAZOP study 
to cover the possible hazards in a plant foreseeable with 
the applied abstraction level in the MFM modelling. 
However a more detailed and systematic study of the 
different steps in the three phases of a HAZOP needs to 
be performed to further validate such a speculation. 
 
3.5 Plant wide HAZOP 
The ability of the Functional HAZOP Assistant also has 
been investigated for revealing more complex hazards 
in a plant. Here a very simplified functional model was 
developed for the IVaRDiP as shown in Fig 7, where 
the mass flow of the distillation column is combined 
with a very simple energy flowstructure for the heat 
pump shown in the upper left hand side of the Fig. 
Using this model it was shown that the Functional 
HAZOP Assistant facilitates the discovery of root 
causes of deviations, which originate far from the node 
in which the deviation occurs. Some recent loss events 
in the chemical industry have involved such 
situations[14]. 
 
4 Discussion and conclusions 
A goal based methodology for HAZOP analysis using a 
Functional HAZOP procedure is introduced, which 
allows even fresh chemical engineers to contribute 
meaningfully to a HAZOP study. The approach reduces 
the work involved in a HAZOP of a plant by dividing 
the plant along functional lines and analysing nodes 
with the same function once only. This also appears to 
reduce the needed time commitment of key personel 
towards a HAZOP study. Furthermore functional 
models of chemical plants are demonstrated to provide 
a useful approach for development of a Functional 
HAZOP Assistant.  On a simple model of a part of an 
indirect vapour recompression distillation pilot plant 
the Functional HAZOP Assistant finds the same causes 
as a traditional HAZOP study. It has furthermore been 
demonstrated, that the proposed Functional HAZOP 
Assistant is able to find causes far from the site of the 
deviation. This promising development calls for a more 
systematic study of the workflow involved in HAZOP 
studies to further enable design of efficient tools for 
supporting the important HAZOP studies for 
improvements in Safety Critical Operations of the 
increasingly complex infrastructures employed in 
society such as power plants using many different 
power sources: nuclear, hydrocarbons, wind and 
biofuels. 
Fig 7. Simple total mass flow MFM model of distillation 
pilot plant with objectives to maintain constant level in the 
accumulator and constant energy flow in the heat pump. 
 
References 
[1] VENKATSUBRAMANIAN, V., ZHAO, J. 
VISWA-NATHAN, S.: Intelligent systems for HAZOP 
analysis of complex process plants, computers chemical 
engineering, 2000, 24(24):2291-2302. 
[2] VENKATSUBRAMANIAN, V., VAIDHYANATHAN, R.: 
A knowledge-based framework for automating HAZOP 
analysis, AICHE J., 1994, 40(3):496-505. 
[3] BRAGOTTO, P., MONTI, M., GIANNINI, F., ANSALDI, 
S.: Exploiting process plant digital representation for risk 
analysis, J.LOSS PREV. PROCESS IND, 2007, 
20(1):69-78. 
[4] STEP ISO STANDARD 10303-1: Industrial automation 
systems and integration-product data representation and 
exchange—Part I: Overview and fundamental principles, 
1994. 
[5] CRAWLEY, F., TYLER, B.: Hazard identification 
methods, Rugby: IChemE, 2003. 
[6] LEES, F.P.: Loss prevention in the process industries, 
 Nuclear Safety and Simulation, Vol. 1, Number 2, June 2010 141 
ROSSING Netta Liin, LIND Morten, JENSEN Niels, and JØRGENSEN Sten Bay 
 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001:3rd edition. [11] VON WRIGHT, G. H.: norm and action, London: 
Routledge & Kegan, 1963. [7] LAWLEY, H.G.: Operability studies and hazard analysis, 
Chem. Engng. Progress, 1974 70(4): 45-56. [12] FRIEDMAN-HILL, E.: Jess in action, Greenwich: 
Manning Publications, 2003. [8] SKELTON, B.: Process safety analysis - an introduction, 
Rugby: IChemE, 1997. [13] ROSSING, N.L.: Method development for systematic risk 
assessment, Kgs.Lyngby: Technical University of 
Denmark Dept.of Chemical Engineering, M.Sc. Thesis, 
2006. 
[9] LIND, M.: Representing goals and functions of complex 
systems. An Introduction to Multilevel Flow Modelling, 
Kgs.Lyngby: Technical University of Denmark, 1990. 
[10] LIND, M.: Modeling goals and functions of complex 
industrial plant, APPL. Artificial Intelligence, 1994  
8(2):259-283. 
[14] MOGFORD, J.: Fatal accident investigation report, Texas 
City:BP, 2005. 
 
142 Nuclear Safety and Simulation, Vol. 1, Number 2, June 2010  
